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A NEW WEAPON AGAINST CONFIDENCE GAMES
WILLIAM F. CROWLEY
The author is First Assistant Attorney General of the State of Montana. His article is based
upon a decision which has stood unaltered since it was rendered. Mr. Crowley believes there will
be no change in the law in the near future since "confidence games in Montana seem to have van-
ished."-EDrroR.
For over ten years the law enforcement officers
of southwestern Montana were harassed by a
swindling operation so carefully planned and
executed that it was apparently immune from the
law. It was finally stopped in the summer of 1957
by a prosecution that completely changed Montana
confidence game law. The method was specialized
to deal with a rare kind of operation, but can be
useful in a much wider area.
A swindle is usually a success only if the swindler
can disappear quickly and successfully afterward.
This operation depended on the disappearance of
the victims, and it was so successful in choosing
the right victims that it operated almost without
interruption for over ten summers.
Although it took in as much as a thousand
dollars a day, this confidence game looked like
anything but a big money swindle. It operated
in a shabby animal display beside a state highway
leading to the west entrance of Yellowstone
National Park. The scheme was merely a version
of the old carnival "count-store", a small "gam-
bling" game where bets must constantly be
doubled. Only by getting a winning number
(which never appears) can the victim, once started,
retrieve his money. W'hen all his funds are gone
he is eased out to make room for a successor. It
seems ridiculous in the middle of the twentieth
century, but this simple swindle was over-supplied
with customers throughout the tourist season and
many travelers never saw Yellowstone Park.
The scheme prospered by the judicious choice of
victims. Only tourists from over a thousand miles
away were taken, and among them only families
with a single male in the group. While the women
and children looked at the animals, the head of
the house was deftly steered into a small shed,
separated from his money, and sent on his way.
If any victim turned back toward the county
seat and the authorities, operations were sus-
pended.
Most victims continued on to the next town be-
fore admitting even to themselves that they had
been swindled. By this time they were in another
county, at least sixty miles from any court having
jurisdiction. Few ever returned to make com-
plaint. Of these, none was ever willing to stay
long enough to be a witness in a criminal prosecu-
tion, or to return when the case could be brought
to trial. Many criminal complaints were filed, but
every action failed for lack of witnesses.
There was a great deal of doubt whether a
conviction could have been secured even if the
witnesses were available. The operation involved
a good deal of sleight of hand. The average victim
was morally certain that he had been defrauded
but could give no adequate description of the way
in which it was done.
CHARAcTEisTics OF THE LAW
In any other type of crime the obvious remedy
would have been to send investigators to the
scene to gather the necessary evidence, but the
peculiarities of the laws governing confidence games
absolutely ruled this out. A short summary of the
peculiarities will show why.
Montana's confidence game statute is similar
to those in effect in the other states. It provides
that:
"Every person who obtains or attempts to obtain from
another any money or property, by means or use of
brace faro, or any false or worthless checks, or by any
other means, artifice, device, instrument or pretense,
commonly called confidence games or bunco, is punish-
able by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding
ten years."'
The courts in construing this type of statute have
held that the distinctive feature of a "confidence
game" is the fact that the scheme can operate
only by gaining the victim's confidence. This, the
I Section 94-1806, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947.
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courts have said, is the test: If the criminal
actually gains the victim's confidence, and, by
an abuse of that confidence, secures his money,
the law is violated. Unless the confidence is gained,
the offense may be a crime but it is not the crime
of confidence game.2
This rule was apparently adopted in the begin-
ning as a handy way of distinguishing between
confidence games and the allied crime of obtaining
money by false pretenses,3 but it soon became an
iron-clad requirement.4 This is the only field of
criminal law where the state of mind of the victim
is an essential element of the offense. 5 The rule
is not founded upon logic, but it has become
embedded in the law and has been carried to
extreme lengths by the courts.
To prove the crime of confidence game, the
courts hold, it is not sufficient to show merely that
the defendant has gained the confidence of the
victim. He must have gained it originally with a
felonious intent.6 If the victim's confidence is
gained by a series of honest transactions, and then
misused, there is no crime of confidence gamej
Again, the confidence of the victim in the swindler
must be full and complete. The fact that the
victim parted with money or property is not
enough. In the case of State vs. Allen8 the Montana
Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a man
who had secured a diamond ring from an elderly
woman by promising her a monthly income of
S200.00 from his oil properties. At one point
during very lengthy testimony the woman testified
that "... in a way I didn't believe him," and
that she "was afraid he was crooked." Although
she later clarified the issue by stating that her
suspicions were not aroused until after she had
parted with the ring, the court held her confidence
2 State vs. Moran, 56 Mont. 94, 182 Pac. 110 (1919);
State vs. Allen, 128 Mont. 306, 275 Pac. (2d) 200,
(1954); State vs. Pickett, 174 Mo. 663, 74 S.W. 844
(1903); People vs. Poindexter, 243 Ill. 68, 90 N.E.
261 (1909).
3 See State vs. Allen, note 2, supra, at p. 308.
4 The rule was stated as early as 1868 in the case of
Morton vs. People, 47 IlL 468 and was firmly entrenched
at the time of the decision in Maxwell vs. People, 158
Ill. 248, 41 N.E. 995 (1895).
- For an excellent discussion see ATWELL, The Conji-
dence Gamte in Illinois, 49 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEw 737, p..743, et seq.
6 People vs. Massie, 311 Ill. 319, 142 N.E. 503
(1924); People vs. Heinsius, 319 Il1. 168, 143 N.E. 783
(1925).
People vs. Gould, 363 Il. 348, 2 N.E. (2d) 324
(1936); People vs. Snyder 327 11. 402, 158 N.E. 677
(1927).
8 128 Mont. 306, 275 Pac. (2d) 200 (1954).
had not been sufficient to make the defendant
guilty of the crime of confidence game.
As a further stumbling block, if the victim is
sufficiently skeptical to make an investigation at
any stage of the transaction, even though com-
pletely unsuccessful, the prosecution is usually
foreclosed.9
All of these restrictions apparently attach even
if the charge is attempting to obtain money by
confidence game, rather than the completed crime.
The victim's confidence must be obtained, or there
is no attempt2
These were the difficulties that blocked a
successful prosecution of the "free zoo" racket.
Ten years of effort had not produced a single
usable witness among the victims, and the evidence
of investigators would be inadmissible because
they did not have confidence in the operators of
the game.
Affairs stood at this point when a member of the
Montana Attorney General's staff, doing research
for some gambling prosecutions, noticed this
statute among the code provisions on gambling:
"Every person who uses or deals with or wins any
money or property by the use of brace-faro, or of any
two-card faro-box, or any brace roulette-wheel or
roulette-table, or any brace apparatus, or with loaded
dice or with marked cards, or by any game commonly
known as a confidence game or bunco, is punishable
by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding
five years.""
The section is almost identical with the "bunco"
statute. 2 The difference lies in its prohibition
against use of any confidence game. The statute
had not been tested since its enactment in 1907,
but the title of the original act recited the inten-
tion "... To Prohibit Certain Games..." 3 The
punishment for violation was only half that
provided by the bunco statute-five years. This
also indicated that a different criminal act was to
be prohibited.
The title and wording of the act was hardly
sufficient to convince a court that the historic
requirements of confidence game law should not
apply. However, we believed that we might be
able to show that the statute, in prohibiting the
9 People vs. Robinson, 299 Ill. 617, 132 N.E. 803
(1921).
0 People vs. Peers, 307 Ill. 534, 139 N.E. 13 (1923).
n2 Section 94-2406, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947.
12 Section 94-1806, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947.
13 Chapter 115, Laws of 1907.
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mere use of the game, made that act alone criminal,
and did not require the obtaining of the victim's
confidence as well as his money.
A search of the codes, past and present, of all
48 states, turned up two similar statutes, and
two cases in point. Section 561-700, Missouri
Revised Statutes, 1949 (since repealed) provided:
"Whoever shall, in this state, deal, play or practice,
or be in any manner accessory to the dealing, playing
or practicing of the confidence game or swindle known
as three-card monte, or of any such game, play or
practice, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon
conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not to
exceed five thousand dollars, or by confinement in the
penitentiary not less than two nor more than five
years."
The only case upholding a conviction under this
statute was State vs. Edgen.14 In that case the
operators had never succeeded in gaining the
confidence of their intended victim. They tried to
get him into a game of three card monte and were
flatly refused. One of them even put up money
for him to bet, but, after winning that bet he
would not play any more. The operators were
convicted of using a confidence game.
The defense on appeal was that the victim's
confidence had never been secured, and no money
or property taken from him, both things being
necessary to a prosecution on the usual charge of
obtaining money by confidence game. The Missouri
Supreme Court held otherwise, saying:
"... The statute (Sec. 561.700 Mo. Rev. St. 1949) is
levelled at playing it, and practicing the game and
the guilt of the person violating it in no way depended
upon whether or not money or property was bet upon
it."
Kansas later adopted the Missouri statute and
in the case of State vs. Terry15 held:
".... It is clear this statute was aimed directly at 'the
confidence game or swindle known as three-card monte,'
or 'any such game, play or practice.' It made anyone
who participated in such a game guilty of a felony and
subject to severe penalties. Its obvious purpose was to
stamp out that game, or any such game. It was not
aimed at fraud or deceit in the many forms that might
be practiced, or at gambling devices, or at gambling
generally, for we already had many statutes dealing
with those matters." (Citing State v. Edgen, supra.)
1 181 Mo. 582, 80 S.W. 942 (1904).
Is 141 Kan. 922, 44 Pac. (2d) 258 (1935).
PREiARING FOR PROSECUTION
The Terry case was reversed on other grounds,
but these two were the only authorities in point
and were favorable to our contentions. We began
preparing a prosecution.
In early June two members of the Attorney
General's staff, dressed as tourists and displaying
Canadian license plates on their car, stopped at
the free zoo and were welcomed in the usual way
by the management.
These men were trained investigators and were
thoroughly briefed on the manner of operation.
They were able to pin down the exact point where
the fraud occurred and recite all the relevant
details at the trial of the operators.
The subsequent prosecution went exactly ac-
cording to plan. The trial court, after some delibera-
tion, decided that the element of confidence was
not necessary under this statute. The problem
arose in acute form, however, when the time came
for the giving of instructions to the jury. It was
necessary that the jury be given a definition of
"confidence game" in the form of an instruction, so
they could determine whether the game used
was the kind of game "commonly known as a
confidence game." Every available definition of
"confidence game" actually defined the complete
statutory offense of "obtaining money 'by con-
fidence game," rather than the game itself. We
finally drafted our own definition and incorporated
it into the following instruction, which was given:
"A confidence game is any swindling operation whereby
one seeks to lead his victim to repose confidence in
him with a view of taking advantage thereof and thus
obtain the victim's money or other property. The
statute under which the defendant has been charged,
and which has been read to you, prohibits any person
from using or winning any money by any game com-
monly known as a confidence game. Consequently the
victim's state of mind, that is to say, whether or not he
had actually reposed confidence in a person using or
winning any money by any game commonly known as
a confidence game, is immaterial. And if you find
beyond a reasonable doubt under the evidence sub-
mitted to you and these instructions that defendant
did use or win any money by any game commonly
known as a confidence game in the manner and form
charged in the information, then you will find the
defendant guilty."
LONG TImE EFFECTS
The jury found the defendant guilty. The case
was appealed to and upheld by the Montana
19591
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Supreme Court. This decision, State vs. Hale,16
is the first case of its kind decided by a court of
last resort in the United States since the Edgen
case, half a century ago. Its significance to pros-
ecutors lies in the adaptability of this kind of
prosecution to the newer kinds of confidence games
now multiplying across the American landscape.
In place of the old schemes where the victim
was taken into a supposedly illegal scheme in-
tending to swindle a third party while actually
being swindled himself, the newer operations pose
as completely honest and legal business transac-
tions. The operators often purport to be bona
fide real estate brokers, rental agents, or even
schools.17 They simply never deliver the goods or
16 -Mont.-, 328 Pac. (2d) 930 (1958).
17 See, for example, the cases of State vs. Weber,
-Mo.- 298 S.W. (2d) 403 (1957); People vs.
Glenn, 415 Ill. 47, 112 N.E. (2d) 133 (1953); and People
vs. Brand, 415 Ill. 329, 114 N.E. (2d) 370 (1953). In
the Weber case the defendant offered an apartment for
rent and collected as much as a year's rent in advance.
He then demanded additional payment for proposed
alterations, and would not permit occupancy or refund
the deposit. At least five people lost a year's rent to this
scheme. The defendants in the Glenn case offered
attractive apartment rentals in an area of housing
shortage. Sixteen people testified that they paid S500
to $1000 each to the defendants who neither owned nor
controlled any rental apartments. The victims were
merely "stalled off" until they gave up in disgust and
services purchased in good faith. Their greatest
protection is that they deal exclusively with people
who are gullible and not very intelligent. These
victims are hopelessly muddled by the "legal"
trappings of the deals they are involved in and
are useless as witnesses. Unless trained investi-
gators can be put on the trail of these operators,
the public cannot be protected.
The Hale case removed some of the legal
protections that have shielded confidence artists
from the investigator. Any jurisdiction can model
a law after the Montana statute with reasonable
assurance of a similar interpretation by its courts.
The doctrine should be useful, also, in those cases
where the swindle is interrupted before any money
changes hands, and in the attempt cases where
the victim is not gullible enough to fall in with the
scheme.
It is doubtful that any confidence game prosecu-
tion in Montana in the future will be lost because
the victims did not have confidence in the swindler.
We hope that it may eventually be the case
throughout the country.
forfeited the money. The offense in the Brand case was
committed through the medium of a construction firm
with a permanent suite of offices and a payroll of 25
persons.
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